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ANTONY ANGHIE*
I am very honored to be here. This is the second LatCrit
Conference I have attended, as I was also present at the 2005
conference in Puerto Rico. I was impressed by the energy,
enthusiasm, and the rich and powerful presentations made by the
speakers at the 2005 conference. This occasion is no different. I have
already learned a great deal from the outstanding panels I have
attended.
My own field is international law. I am a member of the Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) group of scholars,
and I suggest in this short presentation that there is a great deal of
commonality between the goals and purposes of LatCrit and TWAIL.
Considering the issue now, it is striking to me that both projects
emerged at roughly the same time-LatCrit held its first conference in
1996 and TWAIL held its first conference in 1997. Then, in 2000, at
an important conference organized by Professor Ruth Gordon at
Villanova University, a group of scholars from various traditions,
including LatCrit, explored the connections between critical race
theory and TWAIL by focusing on the issue of race in international
law scholarship.'
Many LatCrit scholars have made important contributions to our
understanding of various issues in international law. The work of
scholars such as Keith Aoki, Tayyab Mahmud, Elizabeth Iglesias,
Berta-Hernandez Truyol, Carmen Gonzalez, and Ernesto Hernandez-
Lopez come to mind. Indeed, LatCrit as a movement has initiated
important studies into various aspects of international law. I am both
delighted and impressed to note that, in keeping with its ambition to
* Antony Anghie is the Samuel D. Thurman Professor of Law at S.J. Quinney
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1. See generally Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law:
Convergence and Divergence, 45 VIL. L. REv. 827 (2000).
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relate theory to praxis, LatCrit has initiated a North-South exchange
program that fosters an examination of the relationship between
justice at the national and international levels.
Many of the major themes and issues that animate LatCrit and
which have resulted in its emergence and development over the years
are familiar to TWAIL scholars, even if not expressed in quite the
same lexicon. In their own way, TWAIL scholars have also attempted
to address several of LatCrit's preoccupations, such as the challenges
of departing from the tradition of "imperial scholarship," articulating
principled alternative futures, and the focus on "anti-subordination"
that is such a constant and powerful theme of LatCrit.2
In this brief presentation, I will elaborate on and exemplify
another shared concern of TWAIL and LatCrit studies-the concern
to excavate subordinated knowledges. For me, this involves a number
of interrelated tasks, including examining doctrines and rules from the
perspective of the most disadvantaged as part of an ongoing effort to
understand how rules that are seen as neutral, objective, and fair could
be anything but when examined in terms of their effect. I also suggest
the value of studying history in a critical manner. It is something of a
truism that history is written by the victors. But how might we see
"history" if that history is written from the perspective of the victims?
Sovereignty is the foundation of the discipline of international
law.3 Indeed, international law is commonly understood as the law
that governs relations between sovereign states. My interest lies in
understanding what historical narratives support conventional
approaches to international law and in trying to recover other histories
in order to suggest a new analytical framework-a set of ideas that
might make us better appreciate and illuminate the ways in which
these ostensibly neutral doctrines have affected (and continue to
2. I am indebted to the detailed accounts of the methodologies, politics and
histories of LatCrit that are provided in Berta Hemandez-Truyol, Angela Harris &
Francisco Valdes, Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit
Theory, Community and Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169 (2006); Margaret
Montoya & Francisco Valdes, "Latinas/os" and Latinalo. Legal Studies: A Critical
and Self-Critical Review of LatCrit Theory and Legal Models of Knowledge
Production, 4 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 187 (2008).
3. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (6th ed. 2011) (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter, Leading
Through Law, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 37 (2003)).
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affect) the lives of the people who are often the victims of these
processes.4
I suggest that the conventional history of international law is
based on three fundamental premises. The first premise is that
international law is created through the history and experience of the
West or, even more particularly, Europe. This idea is powerfully
reinforced by the notion that sovereignty itself, the very foundation of
the discipline, was created in Europe, particularly, the model of
sovereignty that emerged with the Peace of Westphalia that ended the
savage Thirty Years War that destroyed much of Europe, extending
from Sweden to the Balkans.
The second closely-related premise is that the non-European
world is peripheral to the making of international law. That is,
doctrines such as sovereignty were created in the European world and
then extended out to encompass the non-European world.
International law is meant to be universal in its scope. Within this
framework, international law only achieved its complete form and
identity once the doctrines created in Europe were applied throughout
the world. This is what basically occurred in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. To say that imperialism was peripheral to the
discipline is not to say that it was a subject neglected by (until
relatively recent times) the Western writers of international law. On
the contrary, virtually all the great writers of the discipline have
written quite extensively on the topic of imperialism and international
law. However, these writers generally treated imperial issues as
practical rather than theoretical. The whole phenomenon of
imperialism raised important questions about how natives were to be
governed. But these questions, at least as perceived by these scholars,
were not of the first theoretical importance. They did not impinge on
the great questions that preoccupied these scholars and on which their
reputations were to be made. Within this conventional scheme, the
4. This may then be seen as an exercise in "interrogating critically." The
observations of Francisco Valdes are very illuminating and apposite here: "To
interrogate critically is to question the multiple array of assumptions, imperatives
and effects-unspoken as well as spoken-that drive the status quo." Francisco
Valdes, The Constitution of Terror: Big Lies, Backlash Jurisprudence, and the Rule
ofLaw in the United States Today, 7 NEV. L.J. 975, 976 (2007).
5. See generally PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-34 (7th ed. 1997).
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non-European world was characterized as somehow inherently lacking
sovereignty. Accordingly, international law plays the benevolent role
of incorporating the non-European world into the Western system of
sovereignty. This may have necessitated imperial rule initially, but
the task of international law was completed in two different stages-
first, when the entire world was encompassed by the one system of
European international law, and second, when previously colonized
states finally emerged, through the process of decolonization, as
sovereign, independent states.
The third related premise is the notion that the major issue
confronting the discipline of international law is how law can be
created among equal and sovereign states. Put differently, is
international law really "law" when the international system lacks an
overarching sovereign that can legislate and enforce the law?
Specifically, how can international law be created in a system of
horizontal authority in which all sovereign states are equal, at least
juridically? This problem of the binding nature of international law
has haunted the discipline since John Austin, a nineteenth-century
jurist, proclaimed that international law was simply a form of morality
because the international system lacked a governing, central
sovereign. 6 Yet, it is unclear why Austin's definition of international
law (of all other possible definitions) has acquired such authority over
time. Nevertheless, the legacy of Austin's argument has been
enduring and it has manifested itself in at least two forms. First, as all
of you who have studied international law have probably found out, it
is customary to begin international law courses by attempting to
address the challenge of defining the field and by presenting the
reassuring argument that international law really is "law," even if not
in the way that domestic law is "law." Indeed, many of the most
classic texts of international law begin by addressing this problem.
Second, all the great scholars of our era have attempted to address this
fundamental challenge and all the issues it raises. It represents a sort
of "Everest" as scholars attempt to provide a theory as to why
international law is binding even if it does not comply with the
Austinian model. While empirical studies may reveal that most
countries abide by international law most of the time, the concept of
"legitimacy" may be used to suggest why states would abide by
6. See generally id.
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principles of international law even though such principles could not
be strictly enforced.
By contrast, I suggest that each of these premises or structuring
principles is either wrong or seriously inadequate in terms of its
characterization-both in the role of non-European peoples in the
making of international law, and in terms of appreciating the effects
of international law on non-European peoples.
I offer an alternative set of propositions. First, I suggest that
international law was not created in Europe and then transferred to the
non-European world. Rather, international law was created out of the
imperial encounter. That is, sovereignty was structured in such a way
as to empower one side, the West, and disempower the other side, the
non-West. The conventional argument suggests that the non-
European world was somehow lacking sovereignty and this
sovereignty had to be gradually bestowed upon them by Europe. But
how was it decided that non-European peoples were lacking in
sovereignty in the first place? I argue that the sovereignty doctrine, as
it emerged from the imperial encounter, plays the crucial role of
stripping non-European peoples of their sovereignty. Once this is
done, these people, dispossessed of the legal personality that would
enable them to participate in the international system and claim rights
within it, can be the object of conquest and violence by imperial
European states. While this conventional approach to sovereignty
presents it as a benevolent process that extends out to empower the
marginalized and disempowered, I would argue that the sovereignty
doctrine has mechanisms of exclusion built within it that are
continuously developed, refined, and adapted by encounters with the
new "others." These "others" are the new challengers to the ever-
expanding reach of international law and the powers it represents.
This process of empowerment/disempowerment is an enduring one.
My argument is that doctrines such as the sovereignty doctrine,
the foundation of international law, are based on particular identities,
which is not a great revelation for international lawyers, who insist-
and in some cases celebrate-the fact that international law was very
explicitly based on European values. International law was based on
the jus publicum Europaeum, the public law of Europe. However, this
European identity did not emerge in splendid isolation. Imperialism,
far from being peripheral to the discipline, is central to its very
existence and character. It could not be otherwise. Historically, it
2012] 315
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was only through the process of imperialism that non-European states
were incorporated into a system of law that was essentially European.
Equally important, in the violence of this encounter, European
international law devised doctrines that would diminish and de-
legitimize non-European peoples. Further, it was vital for these
European states to formulate the doctrines and principles that would
enable them to take control of the resources of those people and would
justify colonial governance over them. It is from these colonial
origins that international economic law and arguably, international
human rights law emerged.
Similarly, the great theoretical question that has preoccupied the
finest minds of the discipline is the question of how order is created
among equal and sovereign states. This question owes its beginnings
in many ways to the model of sovereignty inaugurated by the Treaty
of Westphalia. But this model is seriously inadequate because it
reflects the realities of Western experience, which are somehow
posited as "universal" or as somehow ontologically true. Simply, the
"order among sovereign states" question cannot capture the realities of
non-European peoples precisely because those non-European peoples
were decreed to be lacking in sovereignty. Within the "order among
sovereign states" model, non-European peoples and societies can only
be relevant once they acquire sovereignty. But even such an approach
disregards the processes by which the ostensibly "equal" non-
European entities became sovereign-processes that could have
required numerous compromises resulting in the weakening of these
entities in ways that would continue to affect their supposed
enjoyment of the rights that accompany sovereignty.
But how do we write a history that is adequate for the purposes of
telling the story of the relationship between European and non-
European peoples? What are the themes and principles that emerge if
we use that history as exemplary and formative to the source of the
doctrines and principles of international law? As I have argued above,
such a history, if approached critically' might indicate that sovereignty
should be seen not as a doctrine of empowerment, but of exclusion.
7. A critical approach is necessary for there are many histories of international
law that address the issue of imperialism, but often in completely mainstream ways,
as a story of triumph and self-correction.
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To better illustrate these themes and arguments that may seem
rather abstract, I suggest focusing on what I regard as the founding
moment of modem international law. It is not the Treaty of
Westphalia, but an event that occurred much earlier-the first voyage
of Christopher Columbus:
Sir, [a]s I know you will be pleased at the great victory with which
Our Lord has crowned my voyage, I write this to you, from which
you will learn how in thirty-three days I passed from the Canary
Islands to the Indies with the fleet which the most illustrious king
and queen, our sovereigns, gave to me. And there I found many
islands filled with people innumerable, and of them all I have taken
possession for their highnesses, by proclamation made and with
royal standard unfurled and no opposition was offered to me. To
the first island which I found I gave the name San Salvador, in
remembrance of the Divine Majesty, Who has marvelously
bestowed all this; the Indians call it 'Guanahani'. To the second, I
gave the name Isla de Santa Maria de Concepcion; to the third
Fernandina; to the fourth Isabella, to the fifth, Isla Juana, and so to
each one I gave a new name.8
Let us consider what happened here. The passage begins by
suggesting the hierarchies of the medieval world order, with God and
the sovereign being duly acknowledged. Yet Columbus is completely
lost and disoriented; he believes he has reached his destination in the
Indies, when he has actually landed in an entirely different and distant
continent. But even in the midst of this confusion, his fundamental,
primary instinct as a European explorer remains admirably intact-he
seeks to "take possession" of these peoples and land.
Law enters into the picture in the second sentence: in order to take
possession, a legal ritual is required-a "proclamation made" and
"with royal standard unfurled." But what law could exist as between
such incommensurable societies?9 Columbus seems to anticipate and
address the issue, however, by suggesting that the Indians consented
8. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, LETTER FROM FIRST VOYAGE, reprinted in THE
FOUR VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS: A HISTORY IN EIGHT DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING FIVE
By CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 2 (Cecil Jane ed. & trans., 1988).
9. For a superb analysis of this issue to which I am indebted, see STEPHEN JAY
GREENBLATT, MARVELOUS POSSESSIONS: THE WONDER OF THE NEW WORLD 54
(1991).
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to the whole process when he stated: "and no opposition was offered
to me." What is striking here is the way in which Columbus appears
to simultaneously provide the Indians with an opportunity speak, but
promptly proceeds to speak for them (all this is encompassed by the
phrase "and no opposition was offered to me.") Columbus is engaged
in a conversation with himself. It is also notable that even though
Columbus acknowledges that the Indians can speak, have their own
language, and a system of order ("the Indians after all, call their
islands 'Guanahani"'), he proceeds to erase the existence of the
Indians by replacing their language with his own-"and so to each
one I gave a new name."
This renaming of the islands seems to go beyond merely
providing parallel, alternative, Spanish names. What occurred, in
these few sentences, was the creation of a new world and a
demonstration of the ways in which European law was used to
dispossess people. What occurred here was nothing less than the loss
and acquisition of sovereignty. Importantly, this was a trade mission,
and the manner in which it was pursued raises a number of questions
relating to the relationship between imperialism and trade in this
primordial instance of globalization.
We-LatCrit and TWAIL-need to make the experiences and
perspectives of the disadvantaged (who are the subject of our
concerns) the basis of our inquiry. It is out of this experience that we
may fashion a vocabulary, set of principles, methodology, and even an
epistemology that may be adequate for the purposes of contesting and
undermining traditional narratives and structures. Through the
simultaneous project of contestation and reconstruction, we may make
some sort of headway in the ambitious and difficult task of achieving
some sort of justice.
LatCrit and TWAIL have much in common, and I expect there is
a great deal each project can learn from the other in the future.
Globalization has resulted in the continuous erosion, if not
disappearance, of the distinction between the national and the
international. And the "War on Terror" has raised a number of
further-fraught issues about the relationship between national and
international law.' 0 All these major developments suggest that the
achievement of justice at local and international levels is inextricably
10. See generally Valdes, supra note 4.
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intertwined. My friend, Keith Aoki, with his usual prescience, has
provided us with an analytic framework and a research agenda:
[T]here are lessons to be learned from considering how racialized
spaces are produced within the United States by some of the forces
driving globalization, and thus understandings of race in the United
States, while historically contingent, have deep structural ties to the
global experience arising out of colonialism and imperialism and
their aftermath. Finally, realizing these convergences and
divergences between the international and the domestic underlines
that any transformative agendas that ignores or discounts the
salience of the global will fall short, or conversely, any set of
transformational agendas that fail to grapple with important
localisms such as race in a sophisticated way will likewise fall
short.II
I look forward to further engagement between our two projects.
11. Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the 'Third World' In
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REv. 913, 955-56 (2000).
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